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Recent U.S. Supreme Court case on Confrontation Clause


A recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, focused on the Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of a laboratory report without the testimony of the expert who conducted the underlying testing and then prepared the report.  The DWI trial of Bullcoming occurred after Crawford v. Washington , 541 U. S. 36 (2004) but before Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. ___,(2009).  The Melendez-Diaz case declined to create a forensic evidence exception to Crawford.  The Bullcoming case held that that a forensic laboratory report, created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal proceeding, was testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. Absent stipulation, the Court held the prosecution may not introduce such a report without offering a live witness competent to testify to the truth of the report’s statements.  The opinion is posted below except for the dissent and footnotes.


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DONALD BULLCOMING, PETITIONER
v.
NEW MEXICO
No. 09-10876
United States Supreme Court
June 23, 2011
          Argued March 2, 2011
         ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
 The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause gives the accused "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, . . . the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, this Court held that the Clause permits admission of "[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial . . . only where the decla­rant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." Later, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu­setts, 557 U.S.__, the Court declined to create a "forensic evidence" exception to Crawford, holding that a forensic laboratory report, cre­ated specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal proceeding, ranked as "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes. Absent stipula­tion, the Court ruled, the prosecution may not introduce such a re­port without offering a live witness competent to testify to the truth of the report's statements. 557 U.S., at __.
 Petitioner Bullcoming's jury trial on charges of driving while in­toxicated (DWI) occurred after Crawford, but before Melendez-Diaz. Principal evidence against him was a forensic laboratory report certi­fying that his blood-alcohol concentration was well above the thresh­old for aggravated DWI. Bullcoming's blood sample had been tested at the New Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Divi­sion (SLD), by a forensic analyst named Caylor, who completed, signed, and certified the report. However, the prosecution neither called Caylor to testify nor asserted he was unavailable; the record showed only that Caylor was placed on unpaid leave for an undis­closed reason. In lieu of Caylor, the State called another analyst, Razatos, to validate the report. Razatos was familiar with the testing device used to analyze Bullcoming's blood and with the laboratory's testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor observed the test on Bullcoming's blood sample. Bullcoming's counsel objected, asserting that introduction of Caylor's report without his testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause, but the trial court overruled the objection, admitted the SLD report as a business record, and permitted Razatos to testify. Bullcoming was convicted, and, while his appeal was pending before the New Mexico Supreme Court, this Court decided Melendez-Diaz. The state high court acknowledged that the SLD report qualified as testimonial evidence under Melendez-Diaz, but held that the report's admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause because: (1) certifying analyst Caylor was a mere scrivener who simply transcribed machine-generated test re­sults, and (2) SLD analyst Razatos, although he did not participate in testing Bullcoming's blood, qualified as an expert witness with re­spect to the testing machine and SLD procedures. The court affirmed Bullcoming's conviction.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d 1, reversed and remanded.
 Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Part IV and footnote 6. The Confrontation Clause, the opin­ion concludes, does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made in or­der to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification. The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the ac­cused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist. Pp. 8–16.
 (a) If an out-of-court statement is testimonial, it may not be intro­duced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness. Pp. 8–14.
 (i) Caylor's certification reported more than a machine-generated number: It represented that he received Bullcoming's blood sample intact with the seal unbroken; that he checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample number corresponded; that he performed a particular test on Bullcoming's sample, adhering to a precise protocol; and that he left the report's remarks section blank, indicating that no circumstance or condition affected the sample's in­tegrity or the analysis' validity. These representations, relating to past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination. The potential ramifi­cations of the state court's reasoning, therefore, raise red flags. Most witnesses testify to their observations of factual conditions or events. Where, for example, a police officer's report recorded an objective fact such as the read-out of a radar gun, the state court's reasoning would permit another officer to introduce the information, so long as he or she was equipped to testify about the technology the observing officer deployed and the police department's standard operating procedures. As, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826, makes plain, how­ever, such testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause. The comparative reliability of an analyst's testimonial report does not dispense with the Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S., at 62. The analysts who write reports introduced as evidence must be made available for confrontation even if they have "the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa." Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __, n. 6. Pp. 10–11.
 (ii) Nor was Razatos an adequate substitute witness simply be­cause he qualified as an expert with respect to the testing machine and the SLD's laboratory procedures. Surrogate testimony of the kind Razatos was equipped to give could not convey what Caylor knew or observed about the events he certified, nor expose any lapses or lies on Caylor's part. Significantly, Razatos did not know why Caylor had been placed on unpaid leave. With Caylor on the stand, Bullcoming's counsel could have asked Caylor questions designed to reveal whether Caylor's incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty ac­counted for his removal from work. And the State did not assert that Razatos had any independent opinion concerning Bullcoming's blood alcohol content. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another's testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination. Although the purpose of Sixth Amendment rights is to ensure a fair trial, it does not follow that such rights can be disregarded because, on the whole, the trial is fair. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145. If a "particular guarantee" is violated, no substitute procedure can cure the violation. Id., at 146. Pp. 11–14.
 (b) Melendez-Diaz precluded the State's argument that introduc­tion of the SLD report did not implicate the Confrontation Clause be­cause the report is nontestimonial. Like the certificates in Melendez-Diaz, the SLD report is undoubtedly an "affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact" in a criminal proceed­ing. 557 U.S., at __. Created solely for an "evidentiary purpose, " id., at __, the report ranks as testimonial. In all material respects, the SLD report resembles the certificates in Melendez-Diaz. Here, as there, an officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory re­quired by law to assist in police investigations. Like the Melendez-Diaz analysts, Caylor tested the evidence and prepared a certificate concerning the result of his analysis. And like the Melendez-Diaz certificates, Caylor's report here is "formalized" in a signed document, Davis, 547 U.S., at 837, n. 2. Also noteworthy, the SLD report form contains a legend referring to municipal and magistrate courts' rules that provide for the admission of certified blood-alcohol analyses. Thus, although the SLD report was not notarized, the formalities at­tending the report were more than adequate to qualify Caylor's as­sertions as testimonial. Pp. 14–16.
          Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV and footnote 6. Scalia, J., joined that opinion in full, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined as to all but Part IV, and Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part IV and footnote 6. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer and Alito, JJ., joined.
          OPINION
          Ginsburg Justice
         In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. __ (2009), this Court held that a forensic laboratory report stating that a suspect substance was cocaine ranked as testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. The report had been created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal proceeding. Absent stipulation, the Court ruled, the prosecution may not introduce such a report without offering a live witness competent to testify to the truth of the statements made in the report.
         In the case before us, petitioner Donald Bullcoming was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated (DWI). Principal evidence against Bullcoming was a forensic laboratory report certifying that Bullcoming's blood alcohol concentration was well above the threshold for aggravated DWI. At trial, the prosecution did not call as a witness the analyst who signed the certification. Instead, the State called another analyst who was familiar with the laboratory's testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor observed the test on Bullcoming's blood sample. The New Mexico Supreme Court determined that, although the blood-alcohol analysis was "testimonial, " the Confrontation Clause did not require the certifying analyst's in-court testimony. Instead, New Mexico's high court held, live testimony of another analyst satisfied the constitutional requirements.
         The question presented is whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification— made for the purpose of proving a particular fact—through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification. We hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement. The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.
         I
         A
         In August 2005, a vehicle driven by petitioner Donald Bullcoming rear-ended a pick-up truck at an intersection in Farmington, New Mexico. When the truckdriver exited his vehicle and approached Bullcoming to exchange insurance information, he noticed that Bullcoming's eyes were bloodshot. Smelling alcohol on Bullcoming's breath, the truckdriver told his wife to call the police. Bullcoming left the scene before the police arrived, but was soon apprehended by an officer who observed his performance of field sobriety tests. Upon failing the tests, Bullcoming was arrested for driving a vehicle while "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" (DWI), in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-102 (2004).
         Because Bullcoming refused to take a breath test, the police obtained a warrant authorizing a blood-alcohol analy­sis. Pursuant to the warrant, a sample of Bullcoming's blood was drawn at a local hospital. To determine Bullcoming's blood-alcohol concentration (BAC), the police sent the sample to the New Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD). In a standard SLD form titled "Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis, " partici­pants in the testing were identified, and the forensic ana­lyst certified his finding. App. 62.
         SLD's report contained in the top block "information . . . filled in by [the] arresting officer." Ibid. (capitalization omitted). This information included the "reason [the] suspect [was] stopped" (the officer checked "Accident"), and the date ("8.14.05") and time ("18:25 PM") the blood sample was drawn. Ibid. (capitalization omitted). The arresting officer also affirmed that he had arrested Bull-coming and witnessed the blood draw. Ibid. The next two blocks contained certifications by the nurse who drew Bullcoming's blood and the SLD intake employee who received the blood sample sent to the laboratory. Ibid.
         Following these segments, the report presented the "certificate of analyst, " ibid. (capitalization omitted), com­pleted and signed by Curtis Caylor, the SLD forensic analyst assigned to test Bullcoming's blood sample. Id., at 62, 64–65. Caylor recorded that the BAC in Bullcoming's sample was 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters, an inordi­nately high level. Id., at 62. Caylor also affirmed that "[t]he seal of th[e] sample was received intact and broken in the laboratory, " that "the statements in [the analyst's block of the report] are correct, " and that he had "followed the procedures set out on the reverse of th[e] report." Ibid. Those "procedures" instructed analysts, inter alia, to "retai[n] the sample container and the raw data from the analysis, " and to "not[e] any circumstance or condition which might affect the integrity of the sample or otherwise affect the validity of the analysis." Id., at 65. Finally, in a block headed "certificate of reviewer, " the SLD examiner who reviewed Caylor's analysis certified that Caylor was qualified to conduct the BAC test, and that the "estab­lished procedure" for handling and analyzing Bullcoming's sample "ha[d] been followed." Id., at 62 (capitalization omitted).
         SLD analysts use gas chromatograph machines to de­termine BAC levels. Operation of the machines requires specialized knowledge and training. Several steps are involved in the gas chromatograph process, and human error can occur at each step.
         Caylor's report that Bullcoming's BAC was 0.21 sup­ported a prosecution for aggravated DWI, the threshold for which is a BAC of 0.16 grams per hundred milliliters, §66– 8–102(D)(1). The State accordingly charged Bullcoming with this more serious crime.
         B
         The case was tried to a jury in November 2005, after our decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), but before Melendez-Diaz. On the day of trial, the State announced that it would not be calling SLD analyst Curtis Caylor as a witness because he had "very recently [been] put on unpaid leave" for a reason not revealed. 2010– NMSC–007, ¶8, 226 P.3d 1, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted); App. 58. A startled defense counsel objected. The prosecution, she complained, had never disclosed, until trial commenced, that the witness "out there . . . [was] not the analyst [of Bullcoming's sample]." Id., at 46. Counsel stated that, "had [she] known that the analyst [who tested Bullcoming's blood] was not available, " her opening, indeed, her entire defense "may very well have been dramatically different." Id., at 47. The State, how­ever, proposed to introduce Caylor's finding as a "business record" during the testimony of Gerasimos Razatos, an SLD scientist who had neither observed nor reviewed Caylor's analysis. Id., at 44.
         Bullcoming's counsel opposed the State's proposal. Id., at 44–45. Without Caylor's testimony, defense counsel maintained, introduction of the analyst's finding would violate Bullcoming's Sixth Amendment right "to be con­fronted with the witnesses against him." Ibid. The trial court overruled the objection, id., at 46–47, and admitted the SLD report as a business record, id., at 44–46, 57. The jury convicted Bullcoming of aggravated DWI, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, con­cluding that "the blood alcohol report in the present case was non-testimonial and prepared routinely with guaran­tees of trustworthiness." 2008–NMCA–097, §17, 189 P.3d 679, 685.
         C
         While Bullcoming's appeal was pending before the New Mexico Supreme Court, this Court decided Melendez-Diaz. In that case, "[t]he Massachusetts courts [had] admitted into evidence affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis which showed that material seized by the police and connected to the defendant was cocaine." 557 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 1). Those affidavits, the Court held, were "'testimonial, ' rendering the affiants 'witnesses' subject to the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment." Ibid.
         In light of Melendez-Diaz, the New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that the blood-alcohol report intro­duced at Bullcoming's trial qualified as testimonial evi­dence. Like the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz, the court observed, the report was "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct examination." 226 P.3d, at 8 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 4)). Nevertheless, for two reasons, the court held that admission of the report did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
         First, the court said certifying analyst Caylor "was a mere scrivener, " who "simply transcribed the results gen­erated by the gas chromatograph machine." 226 P.3d, at 8–9. Second, SLD analyst Razatos, although he did not participate in testing Bullcoming's blood, "qualified as an expert witness with respect to the gas chromatograph machine." Id., at 9. "Razatos provided live, in-court tes­timony, " the court stated, "and, thus, was available for cross-examination regarding the operation of the . . . ma­chine, the results of [Bullcoming's] BAC test, and the SLD's established laboratory procedures." Ibid. Razatos' testimony was crucial, the court explained, because Bull-coming could not cross-examine the machine or the writ­ten report. Id., at 10. But "[Bullcoming's] right of con­frontation was preserved, " the court concluded, because Razatos was a qualified analyst, able to serve as a surro­gate for Caylor. Ibid.
         We granted certiorari to address this question: Does the Confrontation Clause permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certi­fication, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification. 561 U.S. __ (2010). Our answer is in line with controlling precedent: As a rule, if an out-of-court statement is testi­monial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the state­ment is unavailable and the accused has had a prior op­portunity to confront that witness. Because the New Mexico Supreme Court permitted the testimonial state­ment of one witness, i.e., Caylor, to enter into evidence through the in-court testimony of a second person, i.e., Razatos, we reverse that court's judgment.
         II
         The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause confers upon the accused "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, . . . the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." In a pathmarking 2004 decision, Crawford v. Washington, we overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which had interpreted the Confrontation Clause to allow admis­sion of absent witnesses' testimonial statements based on a judicial determination of reliability. See Roberts, 448 U.S., at 66. Rejecting Roberts' "amorphous notions of 're­liability, '" Crawford, 541 U.S., at 61, Crawford held that fidelity to the Confrontation Clause permitted admis­sion of "[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial . . . only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine, " id., at 59. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S.__, __ (2011) (slip op., at 7) ("[F]or testimonial evidence to be admissible, the Sixth Amendment 'demands what the common law required: unavailability [of the witness] and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.'" (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S., at 68)). Melendez-Diaz, relying on Crawford's rationale, refused to create a "forensic evi­dence" exception to this rule. 557 U.S., at __– __ (slip op., at 11–15). An analyst's certification prepared in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, the Court held, is "testimonial, " and therefore within the compass of the Confrontation Clause. Id., at __– __ (slip op., at 15–18).[6]
         The State in the instant case never asserted that the analyst who signed the certification, Curtis Caylor, was unavailable. The record showed only that Caylor was placed on unpaid leave for an undisclosed reason. See supra, at 5. Nor did Bullcoming have an opportunity to cross-examine Caylor. Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, therefore, weigh heavily in Bullcoming's favor. The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, although recognizing that the SLD report was testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, considered SLD analyst Razatos an adequate substitute for Caylor. We explain first why Razatos' appearance did not meet the Confrontation Clause requirement. We next address the State's argu­ment that the SLD report ranks as "nontestimonial, " and therefore "[was] not subject to the Confrontation Clause" in the first place. Brief for Respondent 7 (capitalization omitted).
         A
         The New Mexico Supreme Court held surrogate testi­mony adequate to satisfy the Confrontation Clause in this case because analyst Caylor "simply transcribed the resul[t] generated by the gas chromatograph machine, " presenting no interpretation and exercising no independ­ent judgment. 226 P.3d, at 8. Bullcoming's "true 'ac­cuser, '" the court said, was the machine, while testing analyst Caylor's role was that of "mere scrivener." Id., at 9. Caylor's certification, however, reported more than a machine-generated number. See supra, at 3–4.
         Caylor certified that he received Bullcoming's blood sample intact with the seal unbroken, that he checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample number "correspond[ed], " and that he performed on Bullcoming's sample a particular test, adhering to a precise protocol. App. 62–65. He further represented, by leaving the "[r]emarks" section of the report blank, that no "cir­cumstance or condition . . . affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or . . . the validity of the analysis." Id., at 62, 65. These representations, relating to past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination.
         The potential ramifications of the New Mexico Supreme Court's reasoning, furthermore, raise red flags. Most wit­nesses, after all, testify to their observations of factual conditions or events, e.g., "the light was green, " "the hour was noon." Such witnesses may record, on the spot, what they observed. Suppose a police report recorded an objec­tive fact—Bullcoming's counsel posited the address above the front door of a house or the read-out of a radar gun. See Brief for Petitioner 35. Could an officer other than the one who saw the number on the house or gun present the information in court—so long as that officer was equipped to testify about any technology the observing officer de­ployed and the police department's standard operating procedures? As our precedent makes plain, the answer is emphatically "No." See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (Confrontation Clause may not be "evaded by having a note-taking police[ officer] recite the . . . tes­timony of the declarant" (emphasis deleted)); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 6) (Kennedy, J., dis­senting) ("The Court made clear in Davis that it will not permit the testimonial statement of one witness to enter into evidence through the in-court testimony of a second."). The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the number registered by the gas chromatograph machine called for no interpretation or exercise of independent judgment on Caylor's part. 226 P.3d, at 8–9. We have already ex­plained that Caylor certified to more than a machine-generated number. See supra, at 3–4. In any event, the comparative reliability of an analyst's testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar. This Court settled in Crawford that the "obviou[s] reliab[ility]" of a testimonial statement does not dispense with the Confrontation Clause. 541 U.S., at 62; see id., at 61 (Clause "commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing [the evidence] in the cruci­ble of cross-examination"). Accordingly, the analysts who write reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation even if they possess "the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa." Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __, n. 6 (slip op., at 14, n. 6).
         B
         Recognizing that admission of the blood-alcohol analysis depended on "live, in-court testimony [by] a qualified ana­lyst, " 226 P.3d, at 10, the New Mexico Supreme Court believed that Razatos could substitute for Caylor because Razatos "qualified as an expert witness with respect to the gas chromatograph machine and the SLD's labora­tory procedures, " id., at 9. But surrogate testimony of the kind Razatos was equipped to give could not convey what Caylor knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed. Nor could such surrogate testimony expose any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst's part. Signifi­cant here, Razatos had no knowledge of the reason why Caylor had been placed on unpaid leave. With Caylor on the stand, Bullcoming's counsel could have asked ques­tions designed to reveal whether incompetence, evasive­ness, or dishonesty accounted for Caylor's removal from his work station. Notable in this regard, the State never asserted that Caylor was "unavailable"; the prosecution conveyed only that Caylor was on uncompensated leave. Nor did the State assert that Razatos had any "independ­ent opinion" concerning Bullcoming's BAC. See Brief for Respondent 58, n. 15. In this light, Caylor's live testimony could hardly be typed "a hollow formality, " post, at 4.
         More fundamentally, as this Court stressed in Craw­ford, "[t]he text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation re­quirement to be developed by the courts." 541 U.S., at 54. Nor is it "the role of courts to extrapolate from the words of the [Confrontation Clause] to the values behind it, and then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the courts' views) those underlying values." Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008). Accordingly, the Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another's testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.
         A recent decision involving another Sixth Amendment right—the right to counsel—is instructive. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the Gov­ernment argued that illegitimately denying a defendant his counsel of choice did not violate the Sixth Amend­ment where "substitute counsel's performance" did not demonstrably prejudice the defendant. Id., at 144–145. This Court rejected the Government's argument. "[T]rue enough, " the Court explained, "the purpose of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be disre­garded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair." Id., at 145. If a "particular guarantee" of the Sixth Amendment is violated, no substitute procedure can cure the violation, and "[n]o additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation 'complete.'" Id., at 146. If repre­sentation by substitute counsel does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment, neither does the opportunity to confront a substitute witness.
         In short, when the State elected to introduce Caylor's certification, Caylor became a witness Bullcoming had the right to confront. Our precedent cannot sensibly be read any other way. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __(slip op., at 6) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Court's holding means "the . . . analyst who must testify is the person who signed the certificate").
         III
         We turn, finally, to the State's contention that the SLD's blood-alcohol analysis reports are nontestimonial in char­acter, therefore no Confrontation Clause question even arises in this case. Melendez-Diaz left no room for that argument, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded, see 226 P.3d, at 7–8; supra, at 7, a conclusion we find inescapable.
         In Melendez-Diaz, a state forensic laboratory, on police request, analyzed seized evidence (plastic bags) and re­ported the laboratory's analysis to the police (the sub­stance found in the bags contained cocaine). 557 U.S., at __(slip op., at 2). The "certificates of analysis" prepared by the analysts who tested the evidence in Melendez-Diaz, this Court held, were "incontrovertibly . . . affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact" in a criminal proceeding. Id., at __ (slip op., at 4) (inter­nal quotation marks omitted). The same purpose was served by the certificate in question here.
         The State maintains that the affirmations made by analyst Caylor were not "adversarial" or "inquisitorial, " Brief for Respondent 27–33; instead, they were simply observations of an "independent scientis[t]" made "accord­ing to a non-adversarial public duty, " id., at 32–33. That argument fares no better here than it did in Melendez-Diaz. A document created solely for an "evidentiary pur­pose, " Melendez-Diaz clarified, made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial. 557 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 5) (forensic reports available for use at trial are "testimonial statements" and certifying analyst is a "'witness' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment").
         Distinguishing Bullcoming's case from Melendez-Diaz, where the analysts' findings were contained in certificates "sworn to before a notary public, " id., at __ (slip op., at 2), the State emphasizes that the SLD report of Bullcoming's BAC was "unsworn." Brief for Respondent 13; post, at 2 ("only sworn statement" here was that of Razatos, "who was present and [did] testif[y]"). As the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized, "'the absence of [an] oath [i]s not dispositive' in determining if a statement is testimo­nial." 226 P.3d, at 8 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S., at 52). Indeed, in Crawford, this Court rejected as untenable any construction of the Confrontation Clause that would ren­der inadmissible only sworn ex parte affidavits, while leaving admission of formal, but unsworn statements "perfectly OK." Id., at 52–53, n. 3. Reading the Clause in this "implausible" manner, ibid., the Court noted, would make the right to confrontation easily erasable. See Davis, 547 U.S., at 830–831, n. 5; id., at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
         In all material respects, the laboratory report in this case resembles those in Melendez-Diaz. Here, as in Melendez-Diaz, a law-enforcement officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory required by law to assist in police investigations, N.M. Stat. Ann. §29–3–4 (2004). Like the analysts in Melendez-Diaz, analyst Caylor tested the evidence and prepared a certificate concerning the result of his analysis. App. 62. Like the Melendez-Diaz certificates, Caylor's certificate is "formalized" in a signed document, Davis, 547 U.S., at 837, n. 2 (opinion of Thomas, J.), headed a "report, " App. 62. Noteworthy as well, the SLD report form contains a legend referring to municipal and magistrate courts' rules that provide for the admission of certified blood-alcohol analyses.
         In sum, the formalities attending the "report of blood alcohol analysis" are more than adequate to qualify Caylor's assertions as testimonial. The absence of notarization does not remove his certification from Confrontation Clause governance. The New Mexico Supreme Court, guided by Melendez-Diaz, correctly recognized that Caylor's report "fell within the core class of testimonial state­ments" 226 P.3d, at 7, described in this Court's leading Confrontation Clause decisions: Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __(slip op., at 4); Davis, 547 U.S., at 830; Crawford, 541 U.S., at 51–52.
         IV
         The State and its amici urge that unbending applica­tion of the Confrontation Clause to forensic evidence would impose an undue burden on the prosecution. This argu­ment, also advanced in the dissent, post, at 10–11, largely repeats a refrain rehearsed and rejected in Melendez-Diaz. See 557 U.S., at__ – __ (slip op., at 19–23). The con­stitutional requirement, we reiterate, "may not [be] disregard[ed] . . . at our convenience, " id., at __(slip op., at 19), and the predictions of dire consequences, we again observe, are dubious, see id., at __(slip op., at 19–20).
         New Mexico law, it bears emphasis, requires the lab­oratory to preserve samples, which can be retested by other analysts, see N. M. Admin. Code §7.33.2.15(A)(4)–(6) (2010), available at http://www.nmcpr.state.nm.us/nmac/ _title07/T07C033.htm, and neither party questions SLD's compliance with that requirement. Retesting "is almost always an option . . . in [DWI] cases, " Brief for Public Defender Service for District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 25 (hereinafter PDS Brief), and the State had that option here: New Mexico could have avoided any Confron­tation Clause problem by asking Razatos to retest the sample, and then testify to the results of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not conduct or observe.
         Notably, New Mexico advocates retesting as an effective means to preserve a defendant's confrontation right "when the [out-of-court] statement is raw data or a mere tran­scription of raw data onto a public record." Brief for Re­spondent 53–54. But the State would require the defen­dant to initiate retesting. Id., at 55; post, at 4 (defense "remains free to . . . . call and examine the technician who performed a test"), post, at 8 ("free retesting" is available to defendants). The prosecution, however, bears the bur­den of proof. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __(slip op., at 19) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court."). Hence the obligation to propel retesting when the original analyst is unavailable is the State's, not the defendant's. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, n. 14 (1988) (Confrontation Clause's requirements apply "in every case, whether or not the defendant seeks to rebut the case against him or to present a case of his own").
         Furthermore, notice-and-demand procedures, long in ef­fect in many jurisdictions, can reduce burdens on foren­sic laboratories. Statutes governing these procedures typically "render . . . otherwise hearsay forensic reports admissible[, ] while specifically preserving a defendant's right to demand that the prosecution call the author/ analyst of [the] report." PDS Brief 9; see Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __(slip op., at 20) (observing that notice-and-demand statutes "permit the defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after receiving notice of the prosecution's intent to use a forensic analyst's report").
         Even before this Court's decision in Crawford, moreover, it was common prosecutorial practice to call the forensic analyst to testify. Prosecutors did so "to bolster the per­suasive power of [the State's] case[, ] . . . [even] when the defense would have preferred that the analyst did not testify." PDS Brief 8.
         We note also the "small fraction of . . . cases" that "actu­ally proceed to trial." Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 20) (citing estimate that "nearly 95% of convic­tions in state and federal courts are obtained via guilty plea"). And, "when cases in which forensic analysis has been conducted [do] go to trial, " defendants "regularly . . . [stipulate] to the admission of [the] analysis." PDS Brief 20. "[A]s a result, analysts testify in only a very small percentage of cases, " id., at 21, for "[i]t is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic analysis." Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __(slip op., at 22).
         Tellingly, in jurisdictions in which "it is the [acknowl­edged] job of . . . analysts to testify in court . . . about their test results, " the sky has not fallen. PDS Brief 23. State and municipal laboratories "make operational and staffing decisions" to facilitate analysts' appearance at trial. Ibid. Prosecutors schedule trial dates to accommodate analysts' availability, and trial courts liberally grant continuances when unexpected conflicts arise. Id., at 24–25. In rare cases in which the analyst is no longer employed by the laboratory at the time of trial, "the prosecution makes the effort to bring that analyst . . . to court." Id., at 25. And, as is the practice in New Mexico, see supra, at 16, labora­tories ordinarily retain additional samples, enabling them to run tests again when necessary.
         For the reasons stated, the judgment of the New Mexico Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
         It is so ordered.
          Justice Sotomayor, concurring in part.
         I agree with the Court that the trial court erred by admitting the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) report. I write separately first to highlight why I view the report at issue to be testimonial—specifically because its "primary purpose" is evidentiary—and second to emphasize the limited reach of the Court's opinion.
         I
         A
         Under our precedents, the New Mexico Supreme Court was correct to hold that the certified BAC report in this case is testimonial. 2010-NMSC-007, ¶18, 226 P.3d 1, 8.
         To determine if a statement is testimonial, we must decide whether it has "a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. __, __ (2011) (slip op., at 11). When the "primary purpose" of a statement is "not to create a record for trial, " ibid., "the admissibility of [the] statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause, " id., at __(slip op., at 12).
         This is not the first time the Court has faced the question of whether a scientific report is testimonial. As the Court explains, ante, at 14-15, in Melendez-Diaz v. Mas­sachusetts, 557 U.S.__ (2009), we held that "certificates of analysis, " completed by employees of the State Labora­tory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, id., at__ (slip op., at 2), were testimonial because they were "incontrovertibly . . . '"solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact, "'" id., at __ (slip op., at 4) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004), in turn quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).
         As we explained earlier this Term in Michigan v. Bry­ant, 562 U.S. __ (2010), "[i]n making the primary pur­pose determination, standard rules of hearsay . . . will be relevant." Id., at __ (slip op., at 11–12). As applied to a scientific report, Melendez-Diaz explained that pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803, "[d]ocuments kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status, " except "if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial." 557 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 15–16) (citing Fed. Rule Evid. 803(6)). In that circumstance, the hearsay rules bar admission of even business records. Relatedly, in the Confrontation Clause context, business and public records "are generally admissible absent con­frontation . . . because—having been created for the ad­ministration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial." Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __(slip op., at 18). We concluded, therefore, that because the purpose of the certificates of analysis was use at trial, they were not properly admissible as business or public records under the hearsay rules, id., at __ (slip op., at 15–16), nor were they admissible under the Confrontation Clause, id., at__ (slip op., at 18). The hearsay rule's recognition of the certificates' evidentiary purpose thus confirmed our deci­sion that the certificates were testimonial under the pri­mary purpose analysis required by the Confrontation Clause. See id., at __ (slip op., at 5) (explaining that under Massachusetts law not just the purpose but the "sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide" evidence).
         Similarly, in this case, for the reasons the Court sets forth the BAC report and Caylor's certification on it clearly have a "primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Bryant, 562 U.S., at __(slip op., at 11). The Court also explains why the BAC report is not materially distinguishable from the certifi­cates we held testimonial in Melendez-Diaz. See 557 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 2, 4–5).
         The formality inherent in the certification further sug­gests its evidentiary purpose. Although "[f]ormality is not the sole touchstone of our primary purpose inquiry, " a statement's formality or informality can shed light on whether a particular statement has a primary purpose of use at trial. Bryant, 562 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 19). I agree with the Court's assessment that the certificate at issue here is a formal statement, despite the absence of notarization. Ante, at 14–15; Crawford, 541 U.S., at 52 ("[T]he absence of [an] oath [is] not dispositive"). The formality derives from the fact that the analyst is asked to sign his name and "certify" to both the result and the statements on the form. A "certification" requires one "[t]o attest" that the accompanying statements are true. Black's Law Dictionary 258 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of "certify"); see also id., at 147 (defining "attest" as "[t]o bear witness; testify, " or "[t]o affirm to be true or genuine; to authenticate by signing as a witness").
         In sum, I am compelled to conclude that the report has a "primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, " Bryant, 562 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 11), which renders it testimonial.
         B
         After holding that the report was testimonial, the New Mexico Supreme Court nevertheless held that its admis­sion was permissible under the Confrontation Clause for two reasons: because Caylor was a "mere scrivener, " and because Razatos could be cross-examined on the workings of the gas chromatograph and laboratory procedures. 226 P.3d, at 8–10. The Court convincingly explains why those rationales are incorrect. Ante, at 9–13. Therefore, the New Mexico court contravened our precedents in holding that the report was admissible via Razatos' testimony.
         II
         Although this case is materially indistinguishable from the facts we considered in Melendez-Diaz, I highlight some of the factual circumstances that this case does not present.
         First, this is not a case in which the State suggested an alternate purpose, much less an alternate primary pur­pose, for the BAC report. For example, the State has not claimed that the report was necessary to provide Bullcoming with medical treatment. See Bryant, 562 U.S., at __, n. 9 (slip op., at 15, n. 9) (listing "Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment" under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) as an example of statements that are "by their nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution"); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at __, n. 2 (slip op., at 6, n. 2) ("[M]edical reports created for treatment purposes . . . would not be testimonial under our decision today"); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) ("[S]tatements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules").
         Second, this is not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue. Razatos conceded on cross-examination that he played no role in producing the BAC report and did not observe any portion of Curtis Caylor's conduct of the testing. App. 58. The court below also recognized Razatos' total lack of connection to the test at issue. 226 P.3d, at 6. It would be a different case if, for example, a supervisor who ob­served an analyst conducting a test testified about the results or a report about such results. We need not ad- dress what degree of involvement is sufficient because here Razatos had no involvement whatsoever in the rele­vant test and report.
         Third, this is not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying testi­monial reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence. See Fed. Rule Evid. 703 (explaining that facts or data of a type upon which experts in the field would rea­sonably rely in forming an opinion need not be admissible in order for the expert's opinion based on the facts and data to be admitted). As the Court notes, ante, at 12, the State does not assert that Razatos offered an independent, expert opinion about Bullcoming's blood alcohol concentra­tion. Rather, the State explains, "[a]side from reading a report that was introduced as an exhibit, Mr. Razatos offered no opinion about Petitioner's blood alcohol content . . . ." Brief for Respondent 58, n. 15 (citation omitted). Here the State offered the BAC report, including Caylor's testimonial statements, into evidence. We would face a different question if asked to determine the constitutional­ity of allowing an expert witness to discuss others' testi­monial statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence.
         Finally, this is not a case in which the State introduced only machine-generated results, such as a printout from a gas chromatograph. The State here introduced Caylor's statements, which included his transcription of a blood alcohol concentration, apparently copied from a gas chromatograph printout, along with other statements about the procedures used in handling the blood sample. See ante, at 10; App. 62 ("I certify that I followed the proce­dures set out on the reverse of this report, and the state­ments in this block are correct"). Thus, we do not decide whether, as the New Mexico Supreme Court suggests, 226 P.3d, at 10, a State could introduce (assuming an ade­quate chain of custody foundation) raw data generated by a machine in conjunction with the testimony of an expert witness. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 16, n. 5.
         This case does not present, and thus the Court's opinion does not address, any of these factual scenarios.
         As in Melendez-Diaz, the primary purpose of the BAC report is clearly to serve as evidence. It is therefore tes­timonial, and the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce it into evidence via Razatos' testimony. I respectfully concur.